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Abstract
In this paper, we develop an expected utility model for the retirement behav-
ior in the decumulation phase of Australian retirees with sequential family status
subject to consumption, housing, investment, bequest and government provided
means-tested Age Pension. We account for mortality risk and risky investment as-
sets, and introduce a health proxy to capture the decreasing level of consumption for
older retirees. Then we find optimal housing at retirement, and optimal consump-
tion and optimal risky asset allocation depending on age and wealth. The model is
solved numerically as a stochastic control problem, and is calibrated using the max-
imum likelihood method on empirical data of consumption and housing from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009-2010 Survey. The model fits the characteris-
tics of the data well to explain the behavior of Australian retirees. The key findings
are the following: first, the optimal policy is highly sensitive to means-tested Age
Pension early in retirement but this sensitivity fades with age. Secondly, the al-
location to risky assets shows a complex relationship with the means-tested Age
Pension that disappears once minimum withdrawal rules are enforced. As a general
rule, when wealth decreases the proportion allocated to risky assets increases, due
to the Age Pension working as a buffer against investment losses. Finally, couples
can be more aggressive with risky allocations due to their longer life expectancy
compared with singles.
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1 Introduction
The global shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution pension system transfers
risk from the corporate sector to households, primarily via the investment and withdrawal
decision of pension assets. Australia’s move has already accumulated superannuation1
assets of $2.02 trillion dollars (ASFA, 2015), making Australia the 4th largest pension
fund pool in the world. For retirees, the main difference is that instead of being provided
a monthly benefit as they were before, they now receive a lump sum at retirement and are
responsible for managing this wealth throughout their lives. The retirees face multiple
risks including mortality, longevity and investment risks, as well as regulatory risk such as
changes in policies and government provided Age Pension entitlements, which are harder
to account for. The long term effects of this new pension system are not yet known, and
there is limited knowledge amongst retirees and advisors regarding how to consume and
manage the assets. This results in confusion for many retirees (Agnew et al., 2013).
Once retired, Australian retirees tend to keep the same proportion of risky assets
as before retirement, even though the exposure decreases with age (Spicer et al., 2013).
With no labor income these assets are subject to sequencing risk2 which is difficult to
avoid in the decumulation phase, especially early in retirement (Kingston and Fisher,
2014). Conventional recommendations for asset management can no longer apply in this
case, as they are highly dependent on wealth level, age, and Age Pension policies.
The Australian retirement system relies on three pillars - the Age Pension, the super-
annuation guarantee, and private savings. While the former two are mandatory, private
savings are voluntary and are comprised of additional savings/assets such as voluntary
superannuation contributions, private investments, and dwelling. The superannuation
guarantee mandates that employers contribute a certain percentage of the employee’s
gross earnings to a superannuation fund, with a current contribution rate of 9.5%. The
Age Pension is the government managed safety net, which ensures a retiree meeting the
age minimum and passing a means-test3 is entitled to Age Pension. In the means-test,
income and assets are evaluated individually, where a certain taper rate reduces the maxi-
mum payments once income or assets surpasses set thresholds (which are subject to family
status and homeownership). Income from different sources are also treated differently;
financial assets are expected to generate income based on a progressive deeming rate,
while income streams such as labor and annuity payments are assessed based on their
nominal value. The retiree can be qualified for either full, partial, or no Age Pension.
The exact amount they qualify for is determined by the smaller outcome of the income
and asset tests.
With around 80% of the Australian population aged 65 or older being entitled to
full or partial Age Pension, there is an strong need for a model that both captures the
characteristics of Australian data and can explain the behavior of retirees. Empirical
data indicates that 75% of retired households are homeowners, where the home accounts
for 80% of the total wealth in middle-wealth quartiles and almost all of the wealth in
1In Australia, the arrangement for people to accumulate funds for income in retirement is referred to
as superannuation.
2Sequencing risk refers to unfortunate timing of cash flow in the investment portfolio. Drawdown
after negative investment returns will have a greater impact on the long term growth of the portfolio
compared with drawdown after positive investment returns.
3Age Pension rates published by Centrelink as of September 2015.
(www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-pension)
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the lower quartile4. Consumption tends to decrease with age and converges towards a
consumption floor. It is argued that this decline in consumption is due to declining
health of retirees, which reduces their capacity for activity (Clare, 2014; Yogo, 2011), or
retirees having fewer resources reserved for consumption due to longevity risk (Milevsky
and Huang, 2011). Higgins and Roberts (2011) find that the rate of decline with age is
also dependent on wealth, and expenditures tend to converge towards a constant level
as the retiree ages. A model that properly captures these characteristics is required to
estimate the wealth needed in retirement, and to forecast Age Pension budgets and policy
changes from a government perspective.
It is common to model decisions and behavior in retirement using expected utility
maximization models based on dynamic programming techniques. Such models stem
from the seminal work by Yaari (1964, 1965), which was later extended by Samuelson
(1969) and Merton (1969, 1971) who studied the problem in relation to optimal portfolio
allocation. Since then, a vast amount of research has been carried out on various exten-
sions and alternative models, where the decumulation phase of life-cycle modeling has
been a topic of interest. That said, there is limited research where the Age Pension is
based on a means-tested pension function. Research has mainly focused on the effect on
the economy from different means-tested policies and the impact on savings (Hubbard
et al., 1995; Hurst and Ziliak, 2004; Neumark and Powers, 1997 to name a few).
In Australia, which is a very special case of means-testing, there have been two main
approaches to model Age Pension — expected utility maximization via dynamic stochas-
tic programming, or dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models. The DGE models tend
to focus on how policy-changes affect welfare. Using overlapping generations DGE mod-
els, Kudrna and Woodland (2011a) and Tran and Woodland (2014) evaluate the effect of
the means-tests and taper rate changes on the welfare outcome, while Kudrna and Wood-
land (2011b) examine the implication of the recent Australian pension reform extended
with a housing market which is further extended in Kudrna (2014).
While DGE models tend to analyze the effects on the economy, dynamic stochastic
programming models focus on the retiree as an individual. Hulley et al. (2013) investigate
the effect of the Age Pension on consumption and investments under constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility, while Bateman et al. (2007) compare the effect of modeling op-
timal consumption and investment with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility
against CRRA. Ding (2013) captures the behavior of Australian retirees with regards to
consumption, portfolio allocation, and housing in a semi-analytical HARA utility model.
Iskhakov et al. (2015) models the behavior with a HARA utility maximization approach,
but with the purpose of investigating how annuity purchases are affected by different
preferences and scenarios. The reason HARA is preferred over CRRA in the majority
of research is the presence of a consumption floor, which implies a simplified preference
for risk as the consumption floor needs to be maintained. This indicates that financial
advice is non-scalable with respect to wealth.
In addition to the aforementioned, the most important extensions to traditional utility
maximization models from an Australian retirement perspective include housing (Yogo,
2011; Cho and Sane, 2013), bequest (Lockwood, 2014; De Nardi, 2004; Ameriks et al.,
2011) and health (Yogo, 2011).
A limiting factor in models is the desire for analytical solutions. For an analytical
solution to exist it either constrains the number of stochastic variables allowed, or the
4Estimated from data (Department of Treasury, 2010), but consistent with Olsberg and Winters
(2005)
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structure and assumptions of the model. Solving the problem with realistic features
therefore require numerical solutions. In addition, most research studies do not involve
calibration against empirical data. Tran and Woodland (2014) discuss the selection of
model parameters which either match Australian economy rates or are taken from other
research in order to ensure that a general equilibrium steady state is achieved, but are
not calibrated against data. Calibration in Ding (2013) is based on mean squared error,
but residuals are normalized with estimated lifetime wealth. This allows for larger errors
in poor households (but improved fit for wealthier households) as the estimated pension
received will be rather large in relation to actual wealth. Such normalization may affect
the outcome from using said model, especially in forecasting future Age Pension budgets.
Ameriks et al. (2011) calibrates a bequest model using maximum likelihood estimation,
in order to investigate the bequest motives of the US data by separating precautionary
savings from bequest.
The contribution of our paper is a sequential family status model in the retirement
stage that takes into consideration stochastic wealth, stochastic family status and mor-
tality risk, and a health status proxy to allow the model to better fit empirical data. It is
the first sequential model in retirement modeling to our knowledge. Our model is based
on Ding (2013), but can be considered a more realistic extension of his semi-analytical
model as we relax prior assumptions of deterministic investment assets and the order of
means-tests phases, apply a more strict calibration model and account for mortality risk.
We focus on the decumulation phase of the life cycle problem, hence from the point in
time the individual retires. The model is set up as a stochastic dynamic programming
problem and solved numerically via backward recursion. We calibrate the model with
Australian empirical data for consumption and housing, and estimate suitable parameters
via the maximum likelihood method.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the model to include
the Age Pension means-test and present the corresponding optimal stochastic control
problem. Section 3 explains the model calibration process and the assumptions imposed.
Section 4 contains a discussion of the results, and concluding remarks are presented in
Section 5.
2 Model specification
We assume that the agent’s goal is to maximize the expected value of utility that is as-
sociated with consumption, housing, and bequest. Utility is measured by time-separable
additive functions based on commonly used HARA utility functions.
Let (Ω, F , {Ft}t≥0, P) be a filtered complete probability space and Ft represents the
information available before time t. We assume that all the processes introduced below
are well defined and adapted to {Ft}t≥0. Denote the value of liquid financial assets as
random variable Wt and family status as random variable Gt at the agent’s anniversary
dates t = t0, t0 + 1, ..., T , where t0 is the retirement age and T is the maximum age of
the agent beyond which survival is deemed impossible. Realizations of Wt and Gt are
denoted as wt and gt respectively. The utility received at times t is subject to the agent
decision (control) variables αt (proportion drawdown of liquid assets), δt (proportion
liquid assets allocated to risky assets) and the decision variable H (wealth allocated to
total housing only at time t = t0)
5. Given a current state xt = (wt, gt) we can define a
5Note that H represents the price of the house at t0, and not additional wealth invested into housing.
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decision rule pit(xt) = (αt(xt), δt(xt)) which is the action at time t and xt is the value of
the state variables before the action. Then a sequence (policy) of decision rules is given
by pi = (pit0 , pit0+1, ..., piT−1) for t = t0, t0 + 1, ..., T − 1.
The optimization problem is set to begin at the time of retirement t = t0 when all
available wealth is placed in an allocated pension account, and the agent decides how
much wealth to allocate into a family home. Taxes after t0 are not considered since
earnings in an allocated pension account are tax-free. At the start of each year, t, the
agent makes a decision of how much to withdraw from the account, and receives a means-
tested Age Pension Pt. The remaining wealth is placed in a stochastic risky portfolio St
and risk free cash account until t+1, where the agent faces the decision of what proportion
δt to allocate in risky assets. The wealth process and consumption are then given as
Wt+1 = [Wt − αtWt]
[
δte
Zt+1 + (1− δt)ert
]
, Wt0 = W −H, (1)
Ct = αtWt + Pt, (2)
where Wt ≥ 0 is the liquid assets at time t before withdrawal. The initial liquid assets
Wt0 are the remaining wealth after housing allocation at retirement where W is the total
wealth at time t = t0. The housing allocation is constrained with H ∈ {0, [HL,W]}, where
HL ≥ 0 is a lower bound of housing, hence wealth can never be negative. We assume that
risky asset St follows a geometric Brownian motion such that the real log returns of the
risky asset Zt+1 = ln(St+1/St), t = 0, 1, . . . are independent and identically distributed
from a Normal distribution N (µ − r˜, σ) with the mean µ − r˜ and variance σ2, where r˜
is the inflation rate. The real risk free rate rt (adjusted for inflation) is time dependent
but deterministic. The constraints for consumption, where Ct is the consumption and
Pt is the Age Pension, show that consumption equals the sum of received Age Pension
and drawdown of wealth for the current period. By defining the model in real terms
(adjusted for inflation) we can avoid dealing with inflation in consumption, Age Pension
and consumption floor to better capture the characteristics of Australian retirees.
The model operates on a household level, where we separate between couple and single
retiree households due to the Age Pension treating couples as a single entity. The agents
face the risk of family status transitions due to death each period, with the possible states
defined as
Gt ∈ G = {∆, 0, 1, 2}, (3)
whether the agent is already dead at time t (∆), died during (t−1, t] (0), alive at time t in
a single household (1) or alive in a couple household (2), subject to survival probabilities.
An agent can therefore start off at time t = t0 as either a couple or single household. In
case of a couple household, there is a risk each time period that one of the spouses passes
away, in which case it is treated as a single household model for the remaining years.
Zt and Gt are assumed to be independent, hence a large investment loss does not affect
the death probabilities (though one can argue that it might affect i.e. the ability to pay
hospital bills or life quality, which in turn affects death probabilities).
Each period the agent receives utility based on the current state of family status Gt:
Rt(Wt, Gt, αt, H) =

UC(Ct, Gt, t) + UH(H,Gt), if Gt = 1, 2,
UB(Wt), if Gt = 0,
0, if Gt = ∆.
(4)
If the retiree currently is a homeowner, then the difference between H and current house value represent
the change in housing suggested.
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That is if the agent is alive he receives reward based on consumption UC and housing
UH , if he died during the year the reward comes from the bequest UB and if he is dead
there is no reward. Note that the reward received when the agent is alive depends on
whether the state is a couple or single household due to differing utility parameters and
Age Pension thresholds. The terminal reward function at t = T is given as
R˜(WT , GT ) =
{
UB(WT ), if GT ≥ 0,
0, if GT = ∆.
(5)
The current model is based on Ding (2013), but with the addition of sequential family
status, mortality risk and risky asset, and a different health proxy. The retiree wants to
find the policy that maximizes expected utility with respect to the decision for consump-
tion, investment and housing. This is defined as a stochastic control problem
V˜ := max
H
[
sup
pi
Epit0
[
βt0,T R˜(WT , GT ) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,tRt(Wt, Gt, αt, H)
]]
, (6)
that can be solved with dynamic programming by using backward induction of the Bell-
man equation. Epit0 [·] is the expectation conditional on information at time t = t0 if we
use policy pi up to t = T − 1. The policy pi contains the control variables for each time
period and βt,t′ is the discounting from t to t
′.
The subjective discount rate βt,t′ is a proxy for personal impatience between time t
and t′, and set in relation to the real interest rate so that
βt,t′ = e
−∑t′i=t ri . (7)
This assumption suggests that optimal consumption rates would be constant over time
for HARA utility in the absence of mortality risk and risky investments 6.
2.1 Consumption preferences
We assume that the HARA utility comes from consumption exceeding the consumption
floor, weighted with a time dependent health status proxy. The utility function for
consumption is defined as
UC(Ct, Gt, t) =
1
ψt−t0γd
(
Ct − cd
ζd
)γd
, d =
{
C, if Gt = 2 (couple),
S, if Gt = 1 (single),
(8)
where γd ∈ (−∞, 0) is the risk aversion and cd is the consumption floor parameters. The
scaling factor ζd normalizes the utility a couple receives in relation to a single household
7.
The utility parameters γd, cd and ζd are subject to family state Gt, hence will have
different values for couple and single households. Note that the consumption for any
period is based on the pension Pt received in the same period, and the drawdown αt from
the liquid assets Wt as given by equation (2). The proportion of wealth drawn down
can be positive or negative, with a negative value indicating that part of the pension
6This can easily be shown with simple calculus.
7If single and couple households had the same risk aversion and no scaling factor was used, the
solution would suggest similar consumption for both. This effect comes from the consumption smoothing
properties of life cycle models, hence needs to be adjusted as a couple household’s utility is for two people.
It would otherwise cause problems in the calibration stage.
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received is saved for future consumption. As consumption tends to converge towards a
consumption floor as the retiree ages despite wealth status, we define a health proxy to
control the slope of the decline. Let ψ ∈ [1,∞) be the utility parameter for the slope
where the difference between current time t and time of retirement t0 determines the
power of the parameter. This allows the initial time t = t0 to not be affected by a health
proxy, and as the retiree ages the slope of the proxy decreases to allow consumption to
converge over age and wealth groups. This decreasing convex health proxy has a better
fit to empirical data, compared with survival probabilities as used in Ding (2013) which
is decreasing but concave.
2.2 Bequest preferences
We adopt the bequest function in Lockwood (2014) which is a re-parameterized version
of De Nardi (2004), as the parameters are slightly more intuitive. The utility is received
from luxury bequest, hence the home is not included in the bequest8 and is not considered
for such a purpose at the time of purchase. The utility function is then defined as
UB(Wt) =
(
θ
1− θ
)1−γS ( θ
1−θa+Wt
)γS
γS
, (9)
where Wt is the liquid assets available for bequest, γS the risk aversion parameters of be-
quest utility (which is considered to be the same as consumption risk aversion for singles,
since a couple is expected to become a single household before bequeathing assets)9 and
the two parameters θ ∈ [0, 1) and a ∈ R+. The threshold for luxury bequest, a, is the
threshold up to where the retiree leaves no bequest10. If a = 0 then consumption and
bequest are homothetic. The degree of altruism, θ, controls the preference of bequest
over consumption. Low values of θ reflect that retirees prefer consumption over bequest,
while higher values decrease the marginal utility of bequest. As θ → 1 the bequest motive
approaches a linear function with a constant marginal utility of dUB
dWt
= aγ−1.
2.3 Housing preferences
Housing differs from other assets in that it provides a flow of services in terms of the
preference (utility) of owning a house compared with renting, in addition to its residual
value. We apply the assumption that the utility is linked to the house value as in Ding
(2013) and Cho and Sane (2013). The utility from owning a home is defined as
UH(H,Gt) =
1
γH
(
λdH
ζd
)γH
, (10)
where γH is the the risk aversion parameter for housing (allowed to be different from risk
aversion for consumption and bequest), ζd is the same scaling factor as in equation (8),
8As housing is both a necessity and bequest it cannot be treated the same as other bequest (Ding
et al., 2014), since the intentional bequest component is difficult to separate. By using luxury bequest the
model can better explain inequalities between wealth percentiles as wealthier retirees tend to bequeath
a larger proportion of their assets. Previous research finds support for luxury bequest such as De Nardi
et al. (2010) and Lockwood (2014).
9In case couple households have a different risk aversion towards bequest it will be absorbed by
adjusting the ratio of single and couple risk aversion.
10There is strong empirical evidence that wealthy retirees leave a larger proportion of their wealth as
bequest compared with less wealthy (Ameriks et al. (2011), Hurd and Smith (2002), Ding (2013)).
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H > 0 is the market value of the family home at time of purchase t0 and λd ∈ (0, 1] is
the preference of housing defined as a proportion of the market value.
Note the house value H is not indexed with time. The retiree decides how much of
his wealth to allocate to housing at the time of retirement t0, which remains constant
afterwards. We do not consider the house to be a liquid asset, rather a proxy for the
utility received by being a homeowner. Our assumptions reflect the housing behavior of
Australian retirees. Most Australian households do not convert housing assets to liquid
assets in order to cover expenses in retirement, with the exception of certain events (such
as death of a spouse or move to an Aged Care facility) (Olsberg and Winters, 2005).
Wealthier retirees prefer to invest more in the family home as wealth increases, but with
a decreasing marginal utility since the percentage allocation decreases consistent with the
utility model used.
2.4 Age Pension function
We assume that all liquid assets are converted into an allocated pension account at the
time of retirement, as for the year of our data sample over 90% of income came from
allocated pensions. This type of account has the advantage that earnings on assets are
tax free and allows for an yearly income test deduction. The Age Pension received is
modeled with respect to the current liquid assets. The account value is used in the asset
test, and the drawdown from this account is the income generated for the income test.
Based on these assumptions, the Age Pension function can be defined as:
Pt := f(αt,Wt, t) = max
[
0,min
[
P dmax,min [PA(Wt), PI(αtWt, t)]
]]
, (11)
where
PA(Wt) = P
d
max − (Wt − Ld,hA )$dA, (12)
PI(αtWt, t) = P
d
max − (αtWt −M(t)− LdI )$dI . (13)
Here, P dmax is the full Age Pension, L
d is the threshold for the asset and income test
respectively (as indicated by subscript) and $d the taper rate for assets/income exceed-
ing the thresholds, and superscript d is a categorical index indicating couple or single
household status as defined in equation (8). The variables are subject to whether it is a
single or couple household, and the threshold for the asset test is also subject to whether
the household is a homeowner or not h = {0, 1} (see Table 1 for parameterization of
the function). The function M(t) is an income test deduction set when the wealth is
converted into an allocated pension account11, defined as:
M(t) =
Wt0
et0
(1 + r˜)t0−t, (14)
where et0 is the lifetime expected at age t0 and r˜ the inflation. As the model is defined
in real terms, the future income test deductions must discount inflation.
11Income streams commenced after 1st January 2015 may no longer include an income test deduction.
Income is now determined by a deeming rate applied to assets. See Australian government department of
Families and Affairs (2016) regarding this function.
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2.5 Solution as a stochastic control problem
To solve the optimal stochastic problem of maximizing expected utility with respect to
the decision policy, given by equation (6), we follow the theory and notation specified in
Ba¨uerle and Rieder (2011) to define the dynamic programming problem.
The starting point is the basic model where the wealth Wt and family status Gt
are stochastic, and the terminal time T (time beyond which survival is deemed to be
impossible) is fixed. The problem is defined as follows
• Denote a state vector as Xt = (Wt, Gt) ∈ W × G where Wt ∈ W = R+ denotes the
current level of wealth and Gt ∈ G = {∆, 0, 1, 2} whether the agent is dead, died
this period, alive in a single household or alive in a couple household. The stages
are sequential hence an agent that starts out as a couple becomes single when one
spouse dies.
• Denote an action space of (αt, δt) ∈ A = (−∞, 1] × [0, 1] for t = t0, ..., T − 1
where αt ∈ (−∞, 1] denotes the proportion of wealth consumed and δt ∈ [0, 1] is
the percentage of wealth allocated in the risky asset. The upper boundary of 1
indicates that drawdown cannot be larger than our total wealth, hence borrowing
is not allowed. Negative values for drawdown are allowed however as they represent
savings from Age Pension into wealth.
• Denote an admissible space of state-action combination as Dt(xt) = {pit(xt) ∈ A |
αt ≥ cd−Ptwt } which contains the possible actions for the current state, and indicates
that withdrawals must be large enough to cover the consumption floor, net of Age
Pension received.
• The transition function Tt(Wt, αt, δt, zt+1) := Wt+1 = Wt(1 − αt) × (δtezt+1 + (1 −
δt)e
rt) where zt+1 is the realization of the log return on the stochastic investment
portfolio over (t, t + 1]. We assume the agent is small and cannot influence asset
price.
• Denote the stochastic transitional kernel as Qt(dx′|x, pit(x)) which represents the
probability of reaching a state in dx′ = (dwt+1, gt+1) at time t+ 1 if action pit(x) is
applied in state x at time t. Since the transition function is based on the stochastic
risky return Zt+1, which is Markovian, the transition probability for wealth Wt+1 is
determined by the distribution of the risky return, where Zt+1
i.i.d∼ N (µ− r˜, σ2) with
the probability density function denoted as fN (z). Let q(gt+1, gt) denote Pr[Gt+1 =
gt+1 | Gt = gt]. Since both state variables depend on exogenous and independent
probabilities, we have
Qt(dx
′|x, pit(x), pi)
= Pr[Wt+1 ∈ dwt+1, Gt+1 = gt+1 | Xt = xt]
= Pr[Tt(Wt, αt, δt, Zt+1) ∈ dwt+1, Gt+1 = gt+1 | Wt = wt, Gt = gt]
= Pr[Tt(Wt, αt, δt, Zt+1) ∈ dwt+1 | Wt = wt]× q(gt+1, gt).
(15)
The probabilities for family status are defined as
q(2, 2) = pCt , q(1, 2) = 1− pCt ,
q(1, 1) = pSt , q(0, 1) = 1− pSt ,
q(∆, 0) = q(∆,∆) = 1,
(16)
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where pCt is the probability of surviving one more year as couples or p
S
t as singles.
All other transition probabilities for family status have probability 0.
• The reward function depends on the Gt state as defined in equation (4). If the
agent is alive he receives a reward based on consumption, if he died during the year
the reward comes from bequest, and if he is dead there is no reward. Note that the
reward when alive depends on the Age Pension received and the consumption floor,
which differs for couples and singles.
• The terminal reward function is defined in equation (5).
• The discount factor is defined in equation (7) earlier, with βt,t+1 ∈ (0, 1].
The optimal value function can now be stated as in equation (17) at starting time
t0. The value function can be split into the stochastic control problem with respect to
αt and δt, and the decision problem for H at t = t0 due to the time-separable additive
preferences of the utility functions. A solution for the stochastic control problem is given
by a backward recursion Bellman equation
Vt(Wt, Gt) = sup
pit(xt)∈Dt(xt)
{Rt(Wt, Gt, αt, H) + βt,t+1 Epit [Vt+1(Wt+1, Gt+1) | Wt, Gt]} ,
(17)
where Epit [·] is calculated using the stochastic transition kernel Q(·) given in equation (15)
Epit [Vt+1(Wt+1, Gt+1) | Wt, Gt] =
∑
gt+1∈G
∫ ∞
−∞
Vt+1(Wt+1, Gt+1)fN (zt+1)dz × q(gt+1, gt).
(18)
It is shown in Appendix A that the problem can be simplified if we introduce an alternative
reward function without the housing utility
Rt(Wt, Gt, αt) =

UC(Ct, Gt, t), if Gt = 1, 2,
UB(Wt), if Gt = 0,
0, if Gt = ∆,
(19)
where the corresponding Bellman equation becomes
V t(Wt, Gt) = sup
pit(xt)∈Dt(xt)
{
Rt(Wt, Gt, αt) + βt,t+1 Epit
[
V t+1(Wt+1, Gt+1) | Wt, Gt
]}
= sup
pit(xt)∈Dt(xt)
{Rt(Wt, Gt, αt)
+
∑
gt+1∈G
∫ ∞
−∞
V t+1(Tt(Wt, αt, δt, zt+1), gt+1)fN (zt+1)dz × q(gt+1, gt)},
(20)
and the terminal condition at time t = T is
V T (WT , GT ) = R˜T (WT , GT ). (21)
This allows us to avoid the house value being a state variable, effectively eliminating one
dimension and allowing the problem to be solved as
V˜ = max
H∈[0,W]
[
H t0(H,Gt0) + V t0(W −H,Gt0)
]
, (22)
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where H t(H,Gt) is the summation of housing utility weighted with survival probabilities
at time t given as
H t(H,Gt) =

∑T−1
i=t βt,i[ tp
C
i UH(H,Gt = 2) if Gt = 2,
+ tp
C
i−1(1− pCi−1)H t(H,Gt = 1)],∑T−1
i=t βt,i tp
S
i UH(H,Gt = 1), if Gt = 1,
0, if Gt = 0,∆,
(23)
where tp
d
t′ denotes the probability of surviving from year t to year t
′ for singles (d = S)
or couples (d = C). The validity of the problem setup and existence of optimal policies
is implied by the integrability assumption and structure assumption12.
2.6 Numerical implementation
The model is solved numerically. By discretizing the wealth state on a grid of log-
equidistant grid points W0, ...,Wk for each year t = t0, ..., T we solve the Bellman equation
for value function V (equation (20)) recursively with backward induction. The lower
bound of the grid W0 is set to $1 as the utility for $0 does not exist and the upper
bound Wk is determined by the maximum wealth in the dataset and the risky asset.
We use Wk = Wˆmaxe
(T−t0)µ+5
√
T−t0σ where Wˆmax is the largest wealth sample to find a
conservative upper bound. This means that no extrapolation is needed when integrating
risky returns and so values close to the upper bound have no material effect on the range
[W0, Wˆmax] actually used in the solution. For each grid point in the wealth state we find
an optimal drawdown proportion αt and risky asset allocation δt with a 2-dimensional
optimization.
The value function V is interpolated between grid points based on the shape preserv-
ing Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolation Polynomial (PCHIP) method, which preserves
the monotonicity and concavity of the value function (Kahaner et al., 1988). The need to
interpolate arises from the integration of the stochastic return. Since the value function
is only available at predefined grid points, any values in between needs to be interpolated.
If traditional cubic splines were to be used there is a high chance of the function over-
shooting a point, hence the solution could return a local rather than global maximum.
Linear interpolation requires a much higher grid density at lower values due to the steep
derivative in these regions, hence PCHIP is preferred. In general, given a function f(x)
and state x between two grid points xk ≤ x ≤ xk+1 the interpolant P (x) of f(x) for the
kth interval is calculated as
P (x) =
3hk(x− xk)2 − 2(x− xk)3
h3k
f(xk+1) +
h3k − 3hk(x− xk)2 + 2(x− xk)3
h3k
f(xk)
+
(x− xk)2(x− xk − hx)
h2k
dk+1 +
(x− xk)(x− xk − hk)2
h2k
dk,
(24)
where hk = xk+1 − xk and the slope d of the interpolant depends on the first divided
difference ∆k = (f(xk+1) − f(xk))/hk. If ∆k and ∆k−1 are of opposite polarity then
12Ba¨uerle and Rieder (2011) shows the integrability assumption holds if the reward and terminal
function are bounded from above and satisfies EZn <∞ for all n where Zn is the disturbance term. A
power utility function with γ < 0 has an upper bound of 0, and a log-normal random variable has a
finite expected value, hence the integrability assumption is satisfied.
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dk = 0, otherwise dk is given by
3hk + 3k−1
dk
=
2hk + hk−1
∆k−1
+
hk + 2hk−1
∆k
. (25)
In addition to this, the conditions P (xk) = f(xk), P (xk+1) = f(xk+1), P
′(xk) = dk and
P ′(xk+1) = dk+1 must hold true.
The expectation with respect to the stochastic return in equation (20) is calculated
with Gauss-Hermite quadrature∫ ∞
−∞
e−x
2
f(x)dx ≈
M∑
i=1
w(xi)f(xi), (26)
where w(xi) is the weight and xi is the node at which to evaluate the value function,
which gives an exact result if f(x) is any polynomial up to the order 2M − 1. For details
on how to find the weights and nodes see a textbook on numerical integration, such as
Kahaner et al. (1988). The expectation is then calculated as∫ ∞
−∞
V t+1(Tt(Wt, αt, δt, z), Gt+1)fN (z) dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−x
2
√
pi
V t+1(Tt(Wt, αt, δt,
√
2σx+ µ), Gt+1) dx
≈
M∑
i=1
w(xi)√
pi
V t+1(Tt(Wt, αt, δt,
√
2σxi + µ), Gt+1),
(27)
using M = 5 nodes13. To speed up calculations, a temporary vector is created each year
where the expectation of the value function is calculated for each grid point. By doing
this prior to finding the optimal control we avoid repeating the numerical integration
during the optimization as it is now enough to interpolate.
Finally, once the backward induction has reached t = t0 the initial wealth W0 can be
determined by optimizing the allocation between housing and liquid assets in equation
(22). The optimal path for a retiree can then be derived by following the optimal draw-
down and risky allocation from the policy that corresponds with our wealth grid point
for each time t and keep repeating until the terminal condition at t = T .
We performed tests with additional number of nodes for the Gauss-Hermite quadra-
ture and larger bounds for Wk to ensure the accuracy of our numerical solution. In
addition to this a forward Monte Carlo simulation with random policies was generated
to verify optimality of the solution.
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model using a similar approach and the same data as Ding (2013), but
with maximum likelihood estimation instead of mean squared errors in order to estimate
utility parameters.
13Solving the Bellman equation with 5, 10 or 25 nodes resulted in negligible differences, hence 5 nodes
were chosen to reduce calculation time.
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The calibration is rather computationally expensive. Each time new parameters are
suggested the model needs to be solved 4 times (each combination of single/couple house-
holds and homeowner/non-homeowner), and the model output needs to be generated from
the wealth, age and homeowner data given in each sample. The model output is then
compared with the sample data for consumption and housing to estimate the fit of the
model as in Section 3.4 before the next iteration begin.
The calibration is carried out in two steps. First, a suitable starting point is identified
by searching globally. Each utility parameter is assigned a realistic range of values where
3 different values are selected, hence 1,000 iterations are carried out. Once a starting
point is identified, the parameters are optimized further using the Nelder-Mead Simplex
algorithm until further improvements of the log likelihood function are negligible.
3.1 Dataset
For the dataset we use the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 2009-2010 and the
Survey of Income and Household (SIH) 2009-2010 from Australian Bureau of Statistics
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). This dataset has a limitation in that data is
only collected for private households, hence retirees within assisted care facilities are
excluded. Out-of-pocket health expenses are included, but any costs associated with
private facilities are not. Furthermore, we do not generalize between households with or
without dependents and treat them as one group, even if consumption in reality might
differ.
The samples are filtered by labor status (’not in work force’) and the age requirement
for Age Pension to find eligible retirees, where the age of a couple household is based
on the youngest spouse. The data is then aggregated for each sample to reflect total
expenditure (excluding mortgage payments), family home value, and wealth. In order
to clean the data from possible reporting errors, we remove samples that received no
Age Pension despite being entitled to a material portion, as well as any samples with
expenditure less than $3,000 per year or larger than assets available (liquid assets and
Age Pension). Since the model is restricted to no borrowing any entries with negative
wealth are removed as well. This resulted in 2,017 samples for couple households and
2,038 samples for single households.
3.2 Assumptions
In order to ensure a realistic calibration, some assumptions and constraints are needed.
We impose the following:
- For samples with age older than the entitlement age, we assume that the wealth at
retirement equals the wealth of the sample, in order to calculate the income test
deduction M(t).
- We assume that households are aware of their life expectancy hence can take this
into consideration for decisions.
- A potential home owner is required to have sufficient funds for an initial down pay-
ment on a home. As the first wealth quartile in the dataset are unlikely to be home
owners, a lower threshold for housing is set to $30,000 to make this consistent with
the data. A retiree with wealth below this level can therefore not be a homeowner.
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The following constraints have been imposed on the utility parameters to ensure
meaningful variables, rather than over-fitting the model to the sample data. That said,
none of the constraints were binding for the parameters once the calibration finished.
cd ∈ [0, Pmax], which ensures that the consumption floor does not violate budget con-
straints for poor households. In other words, the necessary spending cannot be
higher than future income in case of no accumulated wealth.
γd < 0, since the utility function is discontinuous at γd = 0 and positive values indicate
risk seeking behavior.
θ ≥ 0, preference of bequest over consumption must be positive as we do not allow
negative bequest.
a ≥ 0, threshold for luxury bequest must be positive.
λd ≥ 0, utility parameter from being a homeowner cannot be negative, as otherwise the
optimization might suggest that selling a house the retiree does not own while still
receiving utility is optimal.
3.2.1 Survival probabilities
The sequential model introduces two extra dimensions to the calibration; the age of the
second person in a couple household, and the age difference between the spouses. In
addition to this, survival probabilities differ between females and males, which would
require additional parallel solutions to the model. If the age difference in couples were
considered this would be very computationally expensive and unrealistic for calibration.
We therefore generalize survival probabilities for single and couple households into a
single unisex dimension.
In order to estimate the unisex survival probability, the ratio of male to females
alive (estimated from the cumulative probability to be alive) is used as weights. The
estimated ratios match the empirical data proportions of males and females alive at any
age t in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011), and can be used as a proxy for survival
probabilities to avoid the gender variable. The unisex probability of surviving one more
year at age t is defined as
pSt = 1−
qMt × tpM0 + qFt × tpF0
tpM0 + tp
F
0
, (28)
where superscript indicates a single unisex household (S), male (M) or female (F) prob-
abilities, and tp0 is the probability of surviving from birth (year 0) to age t. The actual
mortality probabilities are taken from Life Tables published in Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2012).
The assumptions for couple households are different since we already know that both
spouses are alive, hence no weighting of male to females ratios are necessary. The events
of independent deaths of each spouse are non-mutually exclusive, however, we treat them
as if they were mutually exclusive to follow the model assumptions. We do not expect
both spouses to die the same year due to the low probability of this occurring and the
effect it would have on the solution is minimal. The probability of surviving one more
year as a couple at time t is therefore defined as
pCt = 1−
(
qMt + q
F
t
)
. (29)
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3.2.2 Portfolio composition and returns
The expected return and volatility have an important effect on the model calibration. To
make the wealth process as realistic as possible, we estimate a typical portfolio composi-
tion of Self-Managed Super Fund (SMSF) accounts and then use this typical composition
with longer term financial data to find portfolio return. This way we can use the actual
portfolio returns in the calibration, rather than returns based on the optimal allocation
control parameter (which most likely will not be a correct representation for the average
retiree).
In order to estimate the typical portfolio composition we use SMSF data for each
financial year from 2008 to 201414, from which we calculate actual investment returns
on SMSF accounts. The average operating expense ratio reported by ATO for the same
period as the SMSF data is 0.83%15. The portfolio is assumed to be based on a set of
risky assets approximated with S&P/ASX 200 Total Return which includes dividends,
and a risk free asset approximated with the deposit interest rate. The portfolio weight
(proportion risky assets) δ is then estimated with least square regression by regressing
the average SMSF account returns for each year against the returns of S&P/ASX 200
Total Return and the deposite rate. We find δ to be 43.7% with a significance level of
1%. This δ is used as a proxy for risky asset allocation during calibration of the model.
To estimate the long term returns we take the 20 year average log-returns prior to
2010 of S&P/ASX 200 Total Return. The returns are then adjusted to real returns by
deducting inflation (r˜ = 2.9%) and for operating expenses. The final estimates give
rt = 0.005 and Zt ∼ N (0.056, 0.133) which are used in equation (1).
3.3 Parameters
The parameters for the Age Pension are shown in Table 1, and taken for the year 2010 to
match the data. A retiree is eligible for Age Pension at age 65 (male) or 63 (female). We
set the scaling factor for couple households to ζ = 1.3, which is in line with the results in
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) who review research in controlling for family
size and the resulting economy of scale. In addition to this, we set T = 100.
Table 1: Age Pension rates published by Centrelink as at January 2010
Single Couple
Full Age Pension Rate (P dmax) $17,456 $26,099
Income Test
Threshold (LdI ) $3,692 $6,448
Rate of Reduction ($dI ) $0.5 $0.5
Asset Test
Threshold: Homeowners (Ld,h=1I ) $178,000 $252,500
Threshold: Non-homeowners (Ld,h=0I ) $307,000 $381,500
Rate of Reduction ($dA) $0.039 $0.039
14Data contains individual account balances, earnings and drawdowns each year for Self-Managed
Super Fund accounts, taken from a dataset provided by Australian Taxation Office to CSIRO-Monash
superannuation research cluster (not publicly available).
15Data is taken from ’Australian Taxation Office Reports SMSFs: A statistical overview’ for the years
2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13
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3.4 Calibration model
Calibration of the model on the sample data is performed with the maximum likelihood
method. The sample data is split into vectors of single (d = S) and couple (d = C) house-
holds for consumption (cd) and housing (hd). Denote total data as D = {cS, cC,hS,hC}.
The statistical models are assumed to be cdi = c˜
d
i (Θ)e
di and hdi = h˜
d
i (Θ)e
εdi , where cdi and
hdi are sample i from the corresponding dataset, c˜
d
i (Θ) and h˜
d
i (Θ) are the optimal con-
sumption and housing respectively from the model based on wealth and age corresponding
to sample i and the utility model parameters vector is
Θ> =
(
γS γC γH θ a cS cC ψ λ
)
. (30)
Finally, di ∼ N (0, σd ) and εdi ∼ N (0, σdε ) are the independent non-standardized error
terms (residuals).
The log likelihood function of N independent identically distributed samples x =
(x1, x2, ..., xN) from a log-normal distribution such that lnxi ∼ N (lnµ, σ) is
Lx(µ, σ) ∝ −N
2
ln
(
2piσ2
)− 1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
(lnxi − lnµ)2 . (31)
The maximum likelihood estimates of parameters Θ and σ = {σS , σC , σSε , σCε } are ob-
tained by maximizing the total log likelihood
LcS(c˜S(Θ), σS ) + LcC(c˜C(Θ), σC ) + LhS(h˜S(Θ), σSε ) + LhC(h˜C(Θ), σCε ), (32)
with respect to (Θ,σ).
Other distributions such as skew-t lead to some slight improvement in residual fitting,
but since it is not very significant it has not been included in this paper.
3.5 Calibrated parameters
Our estimated parameters (see Table 2) are in line with related literature. The risk
aversion is slightly lower than Ding (2013) who estimated γ = −3, while the consumption
floor is well under the full Age Pension rates but in line with the authors findings. This
can be compared with Ameriks et al. (2011) where the consumption floor is only $5,750
USD (the average social security payment), hence in relative terms our estimates are
higher.
Table 2: Calibrated parameters with standard errors
γS γC γH θ a cS cC ψ λ
Value -1.98 - 1.78 -1.87 0.96 20 726 10 122 15 702 1.18 0.044
Std. Error 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.01 208 1 648 1 826 0.03 0.009
The calibrated health proxy parameter ψ = 1.18 indicates that the preferences for
consumption which exceed the consumption floor decreases with a factor of ψ(γd−1)/2,
hence 0.61 for singles and 0.63 for couples each year due to declining health. To put
this into perspective it equals a decrease of $1,320 per year for the median single house-
hold between age 65-75, and $2,312 for the median couple household. Bernicke (2005)
conducted a US study on empirical retirement data and found that the difference in
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consumption for the same age span was 26.4%, and Higgins and Roberts (2011) find a
20-30% drop in median levels where the decrease is larger for wealthier households, which
confirms our results. Clare (2014) finds an average decrease of 10% for households with
a comfortable lifestyle (roughly 300% higher than our consumption floor) and 2% for a
modest lifestyle (roughly 100% higher than our consumption floor) between the ages 70
to 90. Our calibrated model suggests similar decreases in expenditure, and captures the
characteristics of larger declines for wealthier households.
Finally, θ implies little sensitivity of consumption to wealth, consistent with an expla-
nation that additional wealth is being saved for a bequest. This is very similar to Ding
(2013) (θ = 0.956), which indicates that a sequential model does not affect bequest mo-
tives. That said, our model cannot separate whether this is due to precautionary savings
or indeed clear bequest motives.
4 Results
The calibration output indicates that the model fits the empirical behavior, and the
statistical model is well chosen as the residuals have an acceptable Quantile-Quantile fit.
The assumption that consumption and housing residuals are independent is confirmed as
well. That said, due to the limitations in the data used for calibration (see Section 3.1)
the result should only be considered for healthy households in the post retirement phase.
This is because the survey sample tends to be of better health than what might be true
in reality, as retirees with bad health are more likely to live in an assisted care facility.
4.1 Optimal Consumption
The optimal consumption curve in relation to wealth differs from the one in traditional
utility models, where the deviations can be explained by the Age Pension means-test
parameters (Figure 1). Traditionally, consumption is a smooth, concave and monotone
function of wealth for risk averse agents. Generally this is true for drawdown outside
the upper thresholds of the means-test where no Age Pension is received, but as the
means-test binds the optimal drawdown policy changes slightly to anticipate the Age
Pension received (which equals the area between the dashed and solid curve). Note that
the drawdown curves in relation to the Age Pension thresholds are very similar between
single and couple households. The rate of drawdown in relation to wealth decreases faster
at the point where the retiree goes from full Age Pension to partial Age Pension due to
the income test binding. This is effectively sacrificing current utility from consumption
in order to receive additional future utility from consumption or bequest by adding Age
Pension to liquid assets. This effect decreases with age however, as the sum of expected
future Age Pension decreases due to mortality risk increasing, decreased consumption
over one period will have a larger relative marginal utility loss.
The most obvious effect of the Age Pension means-test on optimal drawdown can be
seen between ages 75-85. The optimal drawdown curve almost perfectly follows the lower
threshold of the income test, and continues where the income and asset tests intersect.
Such behavior would maximize the Age Pension received for less wealthy households,
until the curve tapers off into the asset test zone to avoid increased consumption.
As the retiree ages, the consumption in relation to wealth flattens out even further
to match the effect of declining health. At this point the optimal consumption shows
almost no regard to the means-test, and converges towards the expected result from
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Optimal Consumption for Single Households
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Figure 1: Optimal drawdown (αtwt) and consumption in relation to wealth for the
single non-homeowner case. The shaded zones show whether the asset or income test
is binding and leading to partial Age Pension, or if the retiree would receive full/no
Age Pension. The graphs illustrate the different drawdown and consumption curves for
ages t = 65, 75 and 85 years.
a utility model without means-tested Age Pension. For very low levels of wealth the
drawdown curve disappears to negative territory, indicating that part of the Age Pension
shall be saved as desired consumption can be fully covered by the Age Pension received.
An interesting result of this is the sequence of the means-test phases. Ding (2013)
suggests that retirees go through the Age Pension in phases in the order of no pension,
partial pension due to assets test, partial pension due to income test, and full pension.
This is not necessarily true, especially when behavior such as higher consumption early
in retirement and wealth accumulation for wealthier households are considered.
It can be seen in Figure 3 that phases tend to vary for different expected wealth and
drawdown paths from t0 to T , where wealth grows with the expected return between
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Optimal Consumption for Couple Households
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Figure 2: Optimal drawdown (αtwt) and consumption in relation to wealth for the
couple non-homeowner case. The shaded zones show whether the asset or income test
is binding and leading to partial Age Pension, or if the retiree would receive full/no
Age Pension. The graphs illustrate the different drawdown and consumption curves for
ages t = 65, 75 and 85 years.
each periods. Less wealthy households (Wt0 = $100, 000) tend to stay on full pension as
the wealth is too low to grow to the asset test threshold, despite lower consumption with
age. Wealthier households (Wt0 = $400, 000) however tend to accumulate enough wealth
so that the asset test binds after a period of full Age Pension. Early in retirement it is
possible to switch between phases, where risky returns can increase wealth so that the
asset test binds, which in turn leads to a higher drawdown amount and binding of the
income test.
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Stages of means-test for Single Household
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Figure 3: Phases in means-testing for expected wealth evolution and optimal draw-
down paths given starting wealth Wt0 . Each rectangle corresponds to whether the
means-test binds or if full Age Pension is received for the year.
4.2 Optimal risky asset allocation
The exposure to risky assets in the portfolio is highly dependent on wealth and age. In
general, the percentage allocation tends to increase with age for less wealthy households
but decrease for wealthier ones. The increase in less wealthy households is contrary to
traditional investment advice, which suggests that the allocation of risky assets should
be reduced with age. The effect can be seen in Figure 4. This confirms the findings of
Iskhakov et al. (2015) (as long as the consumption floor is less than the Age Pension) and
Ding (2013) who show that when bequest is considered a luxury, the optimal allocation
of risky assets increases with age, implying higher allocation to risky asset throughout
retirement. Only when bequest is not considered in a utility maximization model is
decreasing the exposure with age indeed optimal (Blake et al., 2014).
The contour chart shows a complex relationship with the means-test and Age Pension.
Exposure tend to be more aggressive when the asset test is binding, as potential losses will
be partly offset by increased Age Pension payments, hence Age Pension and risky assets
are negatively correlated. The local maxima (dark area) in the middle corresponds with
where this offset effect is the greatest (this will disappear if minimum withdrawals are
enforced as studied in Section 4.4). The relative decrease vertically towards full pension
is due to the buffer is no longer proportional, as larger losses cannot be compensated
with more than full Age Pension. As the mortality risk increases, the expected buffer
over the remaining life decreases hence allocation decreases horizontally towards old age.
The downward slope in the local maxima is because of the optimal drawdown rules. Since
drawdown decreases with age the risk of significantly decreasing wealth decreases as well,
resulting in lower levels of buffer against losses being accepted. When no Age Pension
is received from the income test, there is a higher allocation to risky assets the closer to
partial pension we get. As with the asset test, this is due to losses being offset by Age
Pension. The maximum increase is therefore on the threshold between no and partial
Age Pension, as this is where the buffer has the greatest effect. Hulley et al. (2013) finds
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that risky allocation is much higher when the asset test is binding due to the steeper
taper rate, and slightly lower (but still higher than the benchmark) for the income test.
The effect of the Age Pension acting as a safety net to investment is further implied as
lower wealth suggests full exposure to risky assets. These characteristics become clear in
Figure 5.
In addition to the effects from the Age Pension, a few general conclusions can be
derived:
- As wealth increases, allocation decreases. A loss of wealth has more negative
marginal utility than the equivalent gain has positive utility. The difference in-
creases with larger wealth.
- As the retiree ages, the (mortality risk) weight increases towards bequest where
the marginal utility decreases quickly with increased wealth, but with a smaller
negative derivative. This means that preserving capital becomes more important
with age as wealth increases.
- Couples tend to be more aggressive with risky assets. One factor is the slightly
lower risk aversion compared with singles, but since mortality risk is also lower the
couple has a higher chance of recovering negative asset shocks, meaning they have
more to gain from higher risk exposure.
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Figure 4: Optimal allocation in risky assets for single non-homeowners. The horizontal
lines (from bottom up) show the threshold a, the threshold for partial Age Pension due
to asset test, and the threshold for no Age Pension due to asset test.
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Figure 5: Optimal allocation in risky assets for single non-homeowners, given a fixed
wealth. The wealth levels correspond to full pension, the lower threshold of the asset
test, partial pension due to asset test, upper threshold of the asset test and no pension.
4.3 Optimal housing allocation
The literature is inconclusive regarding whether retirees allocate more assets into housing
in order to be eligible for either full or partial Age Pension. We find no evidence that the
model considers means-test levels for optimal allocation of net assets into housing, such
as whether the asset test binds or not at t0. This would show up as kinks in Figure 6
where the wealth equals the asset test thresholds.
The risk aversion for housing falls between the risk aversion of singles and couples.
The different curves for optimal housing is then due to marginal utility of housing in
relation to the marginal utility of consumption. As wealth increases, the risk aversion
for couples favors housing more in relation to consumption than single households do. In
addition, liquid assets for couples tend to be higher hence results in a higher dollar value
allocated into housing than for single households.
4.4 Forced minimum withdrawals
Allocated pension accounts impose minimal withdrawal rates based on age (Table 3). It
can be argued that this should be enforced in the calibration model, however we have
intentionally left it out for the following three reasons:
- Forced withdrawal does not necessarily affect the level of consumption, but it does
affect whether the consumption consists of drawdown of the wealth or Age Pension
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Figure 6: Optimal allocation of total wealth into housing for single and couple house-
holds.
received. A retiree that is forced to withdraw a larger amount of wealth than is
optimal will effectively replace part of the Age Pension with own funds, but consume
a similar dollar amount.
- In response to the global financial crisis of 2007-08, the government provided pension
drawdown relief by reducing the withdrawal rates by 50% between 2008-11 and 25%
between 2011-13. As the data set is taken from 2009-2010, these lower withdrawal
rates applied.
- The benefit (income deduction) of an allocated pension account is no longer avail-
able for new accounts after 1st of January 2015, hence new retirees might opt for
a different kind of account. These accounts might not have forced minimal with-
drawals.
Table 3: Minimum withdrawal rates for allocated pension accounts for the year 2013
and onwards.
Age ≤ 64 65-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95 ≤
Min. drawdown 4% 5% 6% 7% 9% 11% 14%
The minimum drawdown rules do however have an effect on the optimal results that
needs to be brought to attention. First, minimum drawdown limits the assets from
increasing with age due to decreased consumption. The retiree can still get switching
cases between partial pension due to asset test and income test early in retirement,
but this voids the case where the asset test can bind at older age as in Figure 3. It
could potentially happen in case of very high risky returns, but it is not a scenario
that is expected. Secondly, it limits the freedom for planning drawdown and risky asset
allocation to optimize the Age Pension received. It is still possible to some extent, but it
is less available as the wealth level increases. This effect can easily be seen with optimal
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risky asset allocation (Figure 7) compared with when no rules withdrawal are enforced
(Figure 4). The allocation tends to follow the general rules where allocation decreases
with wealth, increases with age for less wealthy households and but decreases for wealthier
households. The exception is the increase for wealthy households until age 80-85, which
is due to mortality risk shifting the weight towards bequest as the retiree ages where this
age corresponds to the tipping point.
Age
W
ea
lt
h
($
1,
00
0,
00
0)
Optimal risky asset allocation Single Household (minimum withdrawal)
 
 
65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
0.5
1
1.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 7: Optimal allocation in risky assets for single non-homeowners with forced
minimum withdrawal. The horizontal lines (from bottom up) show the threshold a,
the threshold for partial Age Pension due to asset test, and the threshold for no Age
Pension due to asset test.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a sequential expected utility model for the decumulation phase of
Australian retirees. The model can be considered a more realistic extension to Ding (2013)
where we introduce stochastic wealth, stochastic family status and a health status proxy,
and relax prior assumptions of the order of means-tests phases. The model is defined
as a stochastic control problem where we solve for optimal consumption, optimal risky
asset allocation, and optimal housing. We solve the problem numerically using dynamic
programming, and calibrate the utility parameters against data from Australian Bureau
of Statistics (2011) using the maximum likelihood method.
We find that the model explains the general behavior of Australian retirees, such
as the declining consumption due to age (health), and can suggest optimal policy for
consumption and risky asset allocation with respect to means-tested Age Pension. The
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optimal policy is found to be highly sensitive to the means-test early in retirement, hence
the retiree can plan ahead to take advantage of Age Pension. The effect fades however
with age, as the expected future Age Pension decreases due to increased mortality risk.
The possibility to plan drawdown and risky asset allocation with respect to Age Pension
is however limited when minimum withdrawal rules are enforced - especially for wealthier
households.
Since the family status is sequential, it is of interest to understand the differences be-
tween single households and couple households. In general, we find that the two behave
very similar with respect to wealth drawdown, allocation to risky assets and allocation
to housing. The main difference is that couples can accept higher investment risk due to
lower mortality risk, and tend to favor owning a home slightly more than single house-
holds.
The means-test is often assumed to go through different phases sequentially. We find
that this is only true if minimum withdrawal rules are enforced. If not, it’s likely that
households accumulate wealth later in retirement due to decreased consumption, hence
a retiree can go from receiving full Age Pension to partial due to the asset test.
The model lends itself to applications on both macro and micro scale. It can be used
to forecast future Age Pension needs, implications of policy changes (or new financial
products) in retirement behavior, and on a financial planning level once individual risk
preferences have been estimated. It can easily be extended to suit the defined contribution
pension system of other countries, or future changes in the Australia Superannuation.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by the CSIRO-Monash Superannuation Research Cluster,
a collaboration among CSIRO, Monash University, Griffith University, the University of
Western Australia, the University of Warwick, and stakeholders of the retirement system
in the interest of better outcomes for all. Alex Novikov acknowledges the support of the
Australian Research Councils Discovery Projects funding scheme (DP130103315). We
thank Xiaolin Luo for valuable discussions and comments.
A Separation of Housing utility
Consider the value function in equation (6), which shows the optimal expected value
function conditional on information at time t = t0 if we use policy pi up to t = T −1. The
following shows that utility for housing can be separated into a decision problem for H at
time t = t0 separate from the consumption and bequest utility, in order to avoid having
house value as a state variable (thereby avoiding an additional dimension). The following
is for a single household, but the approach is valid for couple households as well.
Introduce an alternative reward function without the housing utility
Rt(Wt, Gt, αt) =

UC(Ct, Gt, t), if Gt = 1, 2,
UB(Wt), if Gt = 0,
0, if Gt = ∆.
(A.1)
Since Epit0 is condition on the wealth process and family status, and utility is time-separably
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additive, we have
V˜ = max
H
[
sup
pi
Epit0
[
βt0,T R˜(WT , GT ) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,tRt(Wt, Gt, αt, H) | Wt0 , Gt0
]]
= max
H
[
sup
pi
Epit0
[
t0p
S
T−1 βt0,T R˜(WT , GT = 1)
+
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,t
(
t0p
S
t (UC(Ct, Gt = 1, t) + UH(H,Gt = 1)) + t0p
S
t−1(1− pSt−1)UB(Wt)
) | Wt0
]]
= max
H
[
sup
pi
Epit0
[
t0p
S
T−1 βt0,T R˜(WT , GT = 1)
+
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,t
(
t0p
S
t (UC(Ct, Gt = 1, t)) + t0p
S
t−1(1− pSt−1)UB(Wt)
) | Wt0
]
+Epit0
[
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,t t0p
S
t UH(H,Gt = 1) | Wt0
]]
= max
H
[
sup
pi
Epit0
[
βt0,T R˜(WT , GT ) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,tRt(Wt, Gt, αt) | Wt0 , Gt0
]
+
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,t t0p
S
t UH(H,Gt = 1)
]
.
(A.2)
Define a new value function V from reward function R
V (Wt0 , Gt0) = sup
pi
Epit0
[
βt0,T R˜(WT , GT ) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,tRt(Wt, Gt, αt)
]
, (A.3)
and we have
V˜ = max
H
[
V (W −H,Gt0) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,t t0p
S
t UH(H,Gt = 1)
]
. (A.4)
The decision for allocation to housing is made from total wealth, and the remaining liquid
assets after the house value has been subtracted are then available for the stochastic
control problem to optimize consumption and investments.
The separation of housing can also be proven with recursion on the value function in
the Bellman equation in a similar manner.
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